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Does the Year Bear Good Signs? 
Igor Botan, 10 January 2005  
 
 
On Christmas Eve, December 24, 2004, the Parliament adopted the decision No. 444-
XV setting the day of parliamentary elections. Organizing elections on March 6 is in 
full accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Moldova 
(RM), of the electoral code and of a series of decisions of the Constitutional Court 
regarding the expiration of the mandate of the parliament and organization of 
elections of the new parliament. It is remarkable that the provisions of the law No. 
1234-XIV regarding the procedure of electing the president of RM were also taken 
into consideration, so that, theoretically, the new head of state can be elected by the 
Parliament before the expiration on April 8 of the mandate of the present President.  
 
Another event that enjoyed positive comments from the media was the Appeal of the 
President of RM Vladimir Voronin to the Council of Observers of the National Public 
Institution of the Audiovisual the Company "Teleradio-Moldova", in which he 
required from this body to adopt measures to "exclude the wrong or biased 
interpretation of any information about the present activity of the power". Finally, the 
speech of the president Voronin in the autumn-winter session of the Parliament, , set 
common guide-marks for the power and the opposition: ensuring in 2005 elections 
which will express the real will of people: united movement towards European 
principles; Achievement of the Strategy for Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction; country modernization in order to obtain the statute of associated member 
and then of the member of the European Union.  
 
At the first sight, the three events mentioned above, preceding the beginning of the 
electoral campaign, show the fact that there are positive tendencies in Moldovan 
politics. There is no doubt that any political force of opposition with a certain weight 
in RM except the Union of the Citizens "Patria-Rodina", promoting a policy of 
exclusive integration with Russia, can subscribe to the principles listed by the head of 
the state.  
 
However, the positive character of the above mentioned tendencies must not be 
exaggerated. Firstly, it seems obvious that the positive tendencies are rather a 
manifestation of the " survival instinct" of the power. The "pragmatic wing" of the 
governing party decided, probably, to surrender to the danger of what the head of the 
state called the ‚epidemics" that affected Georgia and Ukraine. Secondly, the so-
called pragmatists in the governing party understood, probably, that they cannot 
totally ignore the urgings of international democratic institutions and those of the 
leaders of the most influent democracies to organize free and fair elections. Finally, 
the main opposition forces - the Popular Christian Democratic Party (PCDP), the 
Block "Moldova Democrata" ("Democratic Moldova") (BDM) and the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) conveyed very clear messages to the government that they do 
not believe in their good intentions.  
 
Thus, after adopting on December 15, 2004 the decision regarding the electoral color, 
the Permanent Bureau of PCDP sent the following message to everyone: "The orange 
color became already the sign of benefic innovations in our region. After Romania 
and Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova is the country that must feel the strong impact  
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of the CHANGE, a change marked by the ORANGE color." In his turn, BDM 
organized a series of manifestations of block inauguration during which it accused the 
present power of promoting a dictatorial policy, of intimidating the opposition, 
warning them that the justice system will have them pay for the committed abuses. 
Finally, the electoral campaign began with a scandal related to the fact that SDP 
attacked in the Supreme Court of Justice the decision of the Central Electoral 
Committee (CEC) of December 26, 2004, establishing the date, place and time for 
submission of the documents by potential electoral competitors. PSD accused CEC 
and the governing party of violating the legislation and falsifying elections, since 
according to the article 44(2) of the Electoral Code the information regarding the 
place and the time for receiving documents from the electoral competitors "is made 
public within 2 days after the beginning of the period of candidates' appointment". 
The reasons given by the SDP are based on article 1 of the Electoral Code according 
to which "the electoral period" begins "on the day when the date of elections is made 
public", supposing that it means the day when the decision of the Parliament enters 
into force, i.e. the day when this decision is published in Monitorul Oficial (Official 
Monitor).  
 
Actually, the essence of the accusations brought by SDP to the government is reduced 
to the fact that they manipulated a series of events in order to ensure the registration 
of the governing party as the first electoral competitor, which, according to article 
48(3) of the electoral Code means that this party will be listed first in the ballots too.  
 
Indeed, without consulting the other parliament parties in advance, the majority party 
in the parliament only in the second half of the day of December 24 stated the 
intention to put the draft decision regarding the date for the organization of 
parliamentary elections on the agenda of the plenary session that very day. In the 
opinion of the Popular Christian Democratic Party, by doing this, the majority party 
violated a series of articles from chapters 1 and 2 of Title II of the Parliament 
Regulations regarding the agenda and the legislative procedure. Moreover, this 
decision was voted by the majority in the parliament, despite the fact that the article 2 
of it provided that "the decision enters into force on the day when it is adopted", 
which contradicts the law No. 173-XIII on 6.07.1994 on publication and enforcement 
of official documents. The majority party did not take into consideration the decision 
No. 20 of 20.04.1999 which stipulates that "according to article 1 par. (4) of the law 
mentioned above, the decisions of the parliament enter into force: on the day they are 
published in the Official Monitor or on the day mentioned in the text (i.e. on the day 
of their publishing or eventual date provided by the legislative). The official 
documents entering into force on the day provided in the text are published in the 
official Monitor within 10 days since its adoption." Next day after the adoption of the 
decision regarding the elections day the governing party summoned the Plenary 
Session of the Central Committee during which it adopted the list of candidates and 
after two days, on December 26, 2004, CEC called a meeting during which it adopted 
the decision regarding the place and the time for submitting documents of registration 
of electoral competitors. On the next day, on December 27, 2004, the governing party 
was the first to submit the necessary documents for registration to CEC as the first 
electoral competitor.  
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Thus, the article 2 of the decision of the parliament regarding its enforcement on the 
day of adoption mislead CEC, which could only call the meeting for the establishment 
of the place and the time for submission of documents according to article 25(2) 
providing that "CEC meetings are announced 48 hours before their organization, 
except the meetings during the electoral campaigns, when they must be announced in 
a shorter term if the issues need urgent examination".  
 
Now the question is: what did the governing party get from these actions of taking by 
surprise the political opponents in order to be in the first ones in the ballots?  
 
The answer seems to be - nothing, besides a political scandal which promises to have 
a high resonance damaging the image and feeding the suspicions of the opposition 
and of international organizations specialized in monitoring the elections, while the 
president of the governing party ensures the public opinion of the intention to 
guarantee unilaterally honest elections. The undertaken actions actually have a 
reversed effect.  
 
Indeed, in the elections in 1998 the Communist party was listed first in the ballots, 
accumulating 30 per cent of the votes, while in 2001 it obtained 50 per cent of votes 
though it was the third party on the list. So, taking the opponents by surprise and 
chasing the first place in the ballots had no sense. Secondly, the actions of the 
governing party raised some delicate questions, like the one related to the violation of 
the provisions of the Convention regarding the standards of democratic elections, 
electoral rights and freedoms in the CIS countries ratified in July 2004. However it is 
not known if this Convention entered into force or not even after the announcement of 
the election date. Thus, the legislative framework ensuring the organization of 
elections is not clear. Thirdly, the failure to recognize the mistakes leads to other 
mistakes. Thus, the attempts to justify post - factum the CEC decision are not 
convincing anyway. In this context it is interesting that the Official Monitor No. 241, 
which contained the parliament decision related to the election date, issue that was 
supposed to be published on December 27, 2004 was distributed to the beneficiaries 
for free only on December 31, 2004 together with No. 242-245 of the Official 
Monitor. This is a fact that indicates that the issue in which the parliament decision 
was written post-factum, after SDP appealed to the court. Indeed, what was the point 
to publish on December 27 a special edition of only 18 pages of the Official Monitor, 
which would be distributed together with another edition of 130 pages, on December 
31, while the experience shows that certain editions of official monitors have 250 
pages, especially as the dates of the adoption of published documents in the two 
editions coincide. But it does not save the situation, as the decision of CEC regarding 
the time and place for submitting the documents of the electoral competitors was 
adopted a day before, on December 26. Fourthly, the appeal of SDP to court put the 
latter in an extremely delicate situation. Indeed, a court decision in favor of the 
governing party can have unpredictable consequences for the electoral process in the 
RM, while a decision to invalidate a CEC decision requires the invalidation of the 
decision of the Parliament regarding the setting of the elections date, as it is not clear 
when it was enforced.  
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Unfortunately, under these circumstances, CEC will be the one to bear all the shocks 
and will be bound to find a way to bring things to normal, which would be impossible 
without the involvement of the Parliament, the only body with the right to amend and 
interpret the normative acts. But the Parliament is in vacation until February and until 
then it can be summoned only in an extraordinary session. It is possible that the 
opposition parties will insist on an extraordinary session motivating it by the need to 
bring the electoral process to normal, but especially in order to obtain the largest 
audience to publicly accuse the governing party of acting according to the principle of 
the kind king Dagobert - "what do you need the power for, if you do not abuse it", as 
well as to remind the citizens that there are reasons to believe that in this new year the 
Rooster will announce the Awakening and eventually the CHANGE.  
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Withdrawal of Russian Troops in the Context of CFE Adapted Treaty:   
Perceptions, Interests, and the Changing Nature of European Security 
Iulian Fruntasu, PhD in Political Sciences, 18 January 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 44, January 3-January 16, 2005 
 
Though it is not that well known to the general public, the Treaty on Conventional 
Forces in Europe is one of the corner-stones of European Security. During the Cold 
War it contributed significantly to the maintenance of European stability and security 
by setting up legally-binding levels for conventional armaments (five categories: 
tanks, armored combat vehicles, pieces of artillery caliber 100mm, combat planes and 
attack helicopters), their considerable reduction (altogether 59 000 units until 
28.05.01, when the CFE Review Conference took place), strengthening of 
transparency and confidence-building by establishing the inspection regime and 
exchange of information, as well as setting up the special Flank regime where NATO 
forces and Warsaw Pact were in a closer contact - by setting up smaller number of 
holdings and less flexibilities. With the disappearance of Warsaw Pact and 
disintegration of USSR the member-States launched the process of CFE Treaty 
adaptation to the new political and security realities on the European continent, 
signing the CFE adapted Treaty on 19.11.99 during the OSCE Summit in Istanbul.  
 
As follows, we will review the Decisions adopted during the OSCE Summit regarding 
Moldova, their content and nature, conflicting perceptions of parties involved when it 
comes to the modalities of implementation, the Russian Federation's view regarding 
the adapted Treaty and last but not least the perspectives of the Republic of Moldova 
to use this tool of European security in order to advance its national interests. Due to 
the lack of space, the particular elements of the adaptation process will be explained 
only to the extent to which these shed some light on the problems and challenges 
faced by the Republic of Moldova.  
 
It should be mentioned that during the process of adaptation the Moldovan diplomacy 
spared considerable effort concerning the strengthening of obligation to secure the 
consent of host-state for the temporary deployments, looking for solution in the 
Treaty context to the illegal presence of Russian forces, for solution to the problem of 
Treaty limited equipment unaccounted for. During many years the national interests 
regarding CFE were promoted extremely insistent and in particular during 1999 due 
to the intensification of negotiations. This took place by delivering statements and 
speeches at the Joint Consultative Group tasked to negotiate the adaptation, by 
launching initiatives and draft decisions, by means of countless consultations and 
negotiations both in formal framework and unofficially in Vienna as well as other 
capitals. Taking all these into account the success of Istanbul came as no surprise to 
those directly involved into the process of adaptation, though it cannot be rejected a 
certain positive influence of international circumstances, such as the Western CFE 
member-States' pressure on the Russian Federation for breaching levels for holdings 
in the Flank Zone, in particular, in the Northern Caucasus where Russians launched 
operations using massively conventional armaments. Despite all that, during the last 
two days in Istanbul a scenario was circulated by which Moldova could had been 
sidelined because some important states were afraid that a fundamental decision for 
the European security could be blocked by a regional problem. With some nerve,  
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well-calculated steps, involvement of delegations from Western countries as 
mediators, Moldovan Delegation succeeded to finalize the negotiations with Russians 
around 03.00 o'clock in the morning on 19.11.99, after which followed the CFE 
Conference. The official ceremony of signing the Treaty by Heads of States and 
Governments took place at eight o'clock in the morning, only a couple of hours away 
from the conclusion of negotiations.  
 
So, the Final Act, which is part of the package of understandings together with the 
CFE adapted Treaty1, contains the following references to Moldova: "[Member-
States] …Have taken note of the statement by the Republic of Moldova, which is 
attached to this Final Act, concerning its renunciation of the right to receive a 
temporary deployment on its territory2 and have welcomed the commitment of the 
Russian federation to withdraw and/or destroy Russian conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty by the end of 2001, in the context of its commitment 
referred to in paragraph 19 of the Istanbul summit Declaration."3  
 
Here it is important to make a distinction between the adapted Treaty which by the 
way contains clauses regarding the consent of host-State4, including the Final Act, 
that in turn contains very strong political commitments because they had been 
undertaken in the package with the adapted Treaty, and the Istanbul Summit 
Declaration that has a political implementation regime as any other OSCE document. 
On the other hand it could be argued that the cross-references between the Final Act 
and the Summit Declaration strengthened the mandatory nature of the latter. Istanbul 
Declaration says the following relevant things about Moldova in the first two 
paragraphs: "Recalling the decisions of the Budapest and Lisbon Summits and Oslo 
Ministerial Meeting, we reiterate our expectation of an early, orderly and complete 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova. In this context, we welcome the recent 
progress achieved in the removal and destruction of the Russian military equipment 
stockpiled in the Trans-Dniestrian region of Moldova and the completion of the 
destruction of non-transportable ammunition. We welcome the commitment by the 
Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of 
Moldova by the end of 2002. We also welcome the willingness of the Republic of 
Moldova and of the OSCE to facilitate this process, within their respective abilities 
(underlined by author to reject the Russian claim of conditionality), by the agreed 
deadline."5  
 
The web of legal and political documents, as well as the existing relationships 
amongst them, convey the substance of commitments undertaken with regard to 
Moldova:  
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In package Cross-references 
  
Adapted Treaty  Final Act OSCE Summit Declaration 
The consent of host 
State in present in 
several Articles. 
  1. Withdrawal of 
Russian TLE by 
the end of 2001.
2. Renunciation 
of the right to 
temporary 
deployments in 
the Annex 13. 
  Paragraph 19. The complete 
withdrawal of armed forces by the 
end of 2002. The ammunition and 
other armaments are not obviously in 
the CFE 5 categories, but these are 
falling under the authority of Treaty 
because they are in the armed forces' 
use and their excess is not relevant in 
the document's terms. This somehow 
tautological distinction was accepted 
to speed up the withdrawal of combat 
equipment and it explains the 
differences between the deadlines of 
2001 and that of 2002.  
 
Now, if we place the adapted Treaty with all its commitments in the context of 
European security but also in that of Russian-Moldovan relations, we see that 
Moscow's approaches differ depending on Russian perceptions regarding the threats 
and challenges it is faced with. For instance, during a high-level Conference in 
Munich on February 9, 2004, Serghei Ivanov, the Russian Defense Minister, declared 
that Russia could leave the CFE Treaty due to the fact that Baltic States are joining 
NATO without signing the Treaty. That obviously allows them to disregard the limits, 
inspection and information regimes, which in turn offers the possibility to deploy 
countless Alliance's equipments on the respective territories.6 The Russian Duma 
made a statement along similar lines, arguing that the integration of Baltic States into 
NATO creates a gray area thus Russia as a reaction could review its Istanbul 
commitments regarding its holdings in Kaliningrad and Pskov.7 All this continued 
until NATO offered assurances that the new member-States, including Baltic States, 
will follow the provisions of the CFE Treaty and Alliance's commitments in regarding 
Russia such as the Founding Act of Rrelationship between NATO and Russia, Rome 
Declaration and 2003 Madrid Declaration. The Russian Duma ratified the adapted 
Treaty (previously it was ratified by Belorussia, Ukraine and latter by Kazakhstan) on 
June 25, 20048, and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, participating to the Ministerial 
Council in Sofia at the end on last year, was already appealing in favor of ratification  
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of adapted Treaty.9 This leads us to the conclusion that Russians exercised political 
pressure that turned to be a successful effort because apparently NATO offered 
guarantees on non-deployment of troops in new member-States that were quite 
credible since Moscow moved rapidly from the idea of leaving the Treaty to its 
ratification. In a wider context it is obvious the fact that the CFE adapted Treaty is a 
document that is more convenient to Russian Federation than to the Alliance because 
NATO anyhow was showing some sort of understanding for many years for the 
violation of limits in the Northern Caucasus and for Moscow's behavior in the so-
called near-abroad. Currently, things are changing in the sense that the tolerance 
regarding the illegal presence of Russian troops is diminishing, though Moscow tries 
to underline the adapted Treaty provisions that are convenient to it (it was even able 
to extract additional guarantees from NATO, as we saw) and to downgrade its 
commitments regarding Moldova and Georgia, claiming either that these are political 
and without any deadline for implementation, or that these are bilateral with no effect 
on third parties.10 But if we attempt to imagine a hypothetical situation in which 
Poland would state that its commitment annexed to the Final Act regarding its 
limitation of holdings for tanks at 1 577, for armored combat vehicles at 1 789 and for 
pieces of artillery at 1 370 are not valid any longer because they are political, officials 
in the Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense would definitely hit the ceilings in their 
respective offices.  
 
It is not difficult to notice that Russians manipulate the issue of CFE adapted Treaty, 
with some dexterity, indeed. Moscow knows very well that host-State consent was a 
fundamental principle during negations and that was dully reflected in the adapted 
Treaty. It knows it very well because the Russian diplomats and military were the 
strongest opponents that permanently were against the concept of mandatory host-
State consent. Moscow knows, as well, that the Final Act political commitments are 
included in the package with the adapted Treaty and have a value undoubtedly 
superior to any other OSCE decision, that from legal point of view no decision can 
change the substance and terms of the Istanbul CFE Conference but another CFE 
Conference and that, in the end, NATO's limits of tolerance cannot be tested 
indefinitely by political-diplomatic challenges as those mentioned above. After all, in 
comparative terms it is Moscow that needs more the CFE adapted Treaty by which it 
could monitor the presence and movements of Alliance along its border in the 
circumstance when the Russian conventional armaments are downgrading and the 
mobility element and the air component are superior in NATO's case. It is true, 
indeed, that with an eventual disappearance of the CFE Treaty all sides would lose but 
Moscow's loses would be greater and its hectic behavior during the last half of year 
supports the authenticity of this assertion.  
 
It is crucial to mention that the US position made public only one year after Istanbul 
Summit by Mrs. Albright at the 8th OSCE Ministerial Council in Vienna on 
November 27-28, 2000, that the signature of CFE adapted Treaty was a historic 
achievement possible, in part, because of important commitments made by the 
Russian Federation, is valid today as well, with modification relating to the 
conditionality of ratification upon the complete implementation of commitments, as 
stipulated by the State Secretary Colin Powell at the OSCE Ministerial Council in 
Sofia.11 It might be true that the US and NATO generally could have their own or 
additional reasons to delay the ratification of adapted Treaty but we leave this subject  
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to Russian experts that are more willing and capable in analyzing the imaginary or 
real flaws of the North Atlantic Alliance.  
 
When it comes to Moldova and the CFE adapted Treaty it is relevant to keep in mind 
that from the perspective of many Western chancelleries this Treaty maintains a 
system of relations that affects the security on the whole continent and that it solves 
issues much more important that the presence or withdrawal of Russian army from the 
Moldovan territory. This situation should keep Moldovan diplomacy on the alert and 
to lead to additional political and diplomatic initiatives in consultations on one hand 
with Washington, London and Ankara, and negotiations with Moscow on the other 
hand. It is not the brightest idea of self-gratitude in a reduced capacity, as was shown 
by the 1996 Flank Agreement, to block the ratification of the adapted Treaty when 
this is decided by more important member-States of NATO. The following "Defense 
Monitor's" assertion has a high chance to become reality without serious diplomatic 
initiatives regarding complete withdrawal of Russian army and that of Russian 
separatists: "As it was with its predecessor, the adapted treaty regime will likely be 
plagued by illegal Russian actions in the North Caucasus and the former Soviet 
Socialist Republics. Moscow views noncompliance as consistent with its security 
interests and therefore is willing to risk ostracism while the NATO states are deterred 
from punishing Russia because they are not harmed by the Russian actions"."12  
 
Despite that, at this moment it is clear that the CFE adapted Treaty in Istanbul had a 
positive impact over the security of Moldova, since Russians withdrew and destroyed, 
on Western money, by the way, a significant part of armaments. In this context it is 
meaningful that Moscow keeps the military equipment involved in the so-called 
peace-keeping mission, hoping that these will be exempted from the CFE if its troops 
in Transnistria will receive an OSCE mandate. Another problem is the stock-piles of 
ammunition and armaments that should have been withdrawn by the end of 2002 - 
though this commitment is stipulated in the Istanbul Summit Declaration, these are 
also falling under the authority of CFE Treaty, as explained in the scheme drawn 
above - the distinction was made due to big numbers of armaments and desire to 
speed up the withdrawal of combat equipment in order to reduce the risk of transfer to 
the secessionists armed forces. This army, by the way, is another problem because the 
core of it was established in majority of cases by the deliberate and eager transfers 
from the 14th Army. When the constitutional authorities do not control the Treaty 
Limited Equipment they are called unaccounted for (UTLE). On the territory of 
Moldova there are 18 tanks, 49 armored combat vehicles, 32 pieces of artillery caliber 
100 mm.13 There is an urgent needed to launch diplomatic activities both within the 
CFE framework and using political mechanisms such as NATO-Russia Council, for 
instance, to ensure the complete withdrawal of Russian army and of UTLE from the 
occupied area the responsibility for which should be dully attributed to the Russian 
Federation.  
 
The changing nature of European security requests, in particular from the states which 
are less important from the military and political perspectives, a foreign policy 
characterized by perseverance, imagination and dedication in order to advance better 
the national interests.  
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1 In the adapted Treaty there is a reference clause that says:" Having taken note of the 
Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe held in Istanbul from 17 to 19 November 1999, as well as of the 
statements made by certain States Parties concerning their political commitments 
referred to therein." OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, Istanbul Document, January 2000, 
PCOEW389, p. 119.  
2 This renunciation says: "The Republic of Moldova renounces the right to receive a 
temporary deployment on its territory due to its Constitutional provisions which 
control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces on the territory of 
Moldova." OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, Istanbul Document, January 2000, 
PCOEW389, Annex 13, p. 250. The author' dilemma who, by the way, prepared and 
read the Statement at the CFE Conference, was the contradiction between the short-
term objective (ensuring the withdrawal of Russian troops) and that of medium-term 
objective (joining NATO for which there is a need of temporary deployment). At that 
moment the first objective was more important for the Moldovan security. It is also 
significant and hilarious at the same time that during the negotiations in Vienna the 
Moldovan statement regarding the temporary deployment was received with hostility 
by the Russian Federation that tried to advocate the idea that we cannot renounce a 
right.  
3 OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, Istanbul Document, January 2000, PCOEW389, p. 
236.  
4 A couple of examples where is mentioned the consent of host-State. In the 
Preamble: "Recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in 
their international in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". In the Article I, 
par.3: "Conventional armaments and equipment of a State Party in the categories 
limited by the Treaty shall only be present on the territory of another State Party, or a 
relevant resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Explicit consent must be 
provided in advance, and must continue to be in effect as provided for in Article XIII, 
paragraph 1bis". Istanbul Summit Declaration, OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, 
Istanbul Document, January 2000, PCOEW389, pp. 119-120.  
5 Istanbul Summit Declaration, OSCE, Istanbul Summit, 1999, Istanbul Document, 
January 2000, PCOEW389, pp. 48-49.  
6 "Moscow's threat to leave treaty shocks West", Reuters, February 9, 2004.  
7 "Заявление в связи с расширением НАТО, Государственная Дума 
Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации"  
8 "Госдума ратифицировала соглашение по ДОВСЕ", Интерфакс, 25.06.04.  
9 "Лавров призывал страны ОБСЕ ратифицировать ДОВСЕ", Интерфакс, 
07.12.2004.  
10 "Министр обороны РФ: Стамбульские обязательства России являются 
политическими и не имеют сроков", Интерлик, 13.07.04; "США обусловили 
ратификацию ДОВСЕ выполнением Россией Стамбульских обязательств", 
Интерлик, 07.12.04.  
11 Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the Ministerial Meeting of the 
OSCE in Sofia, 07.12.04  
12 "Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion", The Defense Monitor, 
December 1, 2000.  
 10
13 Regarding the involvement of Russian armed forces in the Dniestr conflict and the 
number of Russian and separatists' holdings, see Mihai Gribincea, Politica rusa a 
bazelor militare: Georgia si Moldova (Civitas: Chisinau, 1999), Mihai Gribincea, The 
Russian Policy on Military Bases: Georgia and Moldova (Cogito: Oradea, 2001); for 
the analysis of evolution of CFE treaty limited equipment, see Iulian Fruntasu, O 
istorie etnopolitica a Basarabiei, 1812-2002 (Cartier: Chisinau, 2002); for a 
documentary report of the armed conflict, see Anatolie Muntean si Nicolae Ciubotaru, 
Razboiului de pe Nistru (Ager-Economistul: Bucuresti, 2004); for a collection of 
documents regarding the conflict and the role of Russian Army, see Mihai Grecu si 
Anatol Taranu, Trupele ruse in Republica Moldova, culegere de documente si 
materiale (Litera: Chisinau, 2004). 
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A faulty start of the election campaign 
Igor Botan, 18 January 2005  
 
 
The fourth parliamentary election campaign has started. Interestingly enough, all the 
electoral campaigns for the parliamentary elections since the Republic of Moldova 
(RM) declared its independence were preceded by problems, including the setting of 
the date of elections  
 
The date of the parliamentary elections of 27 February 1994 was set by decision no. 
1608-XII on the Early Elections of the Parliament, signed by the former Speaker of 
the Parliament, Petru Lucinschi, on the 12th of October 1993, two days prior to the 
adoption of the Law 1609-XII on Parliamentary Elections, of 14 October 1993. The 
arguments for that were related to "the need to speed up socio- economic reforms, 
development of democracy and political pluralism", and also to the awareness of 
"establishing a professional Parliament based on the multi-party system". In other 
words there was a need to elect a new legislative body to substitute the Supreme 
Soviet of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, elected on March 10, 1990, the 
name of which was changed and became the Parliament of the RM.  
 
No doubt that the former Speaker of the Parliament played a determining role in 
promoting the election reform in 1993, by supporting the expert group who developed 
a very good draft law. The only strange thing at that point was the fact that the law on 
parliamentary elections wasn't passed first, which would set the date of elections, 
according to art. 7(1) - "the date of parliamentary elections is established by decree of 
the President of RM." However, this aspect was not in the attention as didn't have any 
major impact on the elections in 1994.  
 
The fact that setting the date of elections can be an opportunity for creating certain 
advantages was first noted in November 1997, when the Electoral Code was to be 
adopted, aimed at introducing standards in the entire electoral legislation of RM. At 
that time, Petru Lucinschi was already President of RM and he changed radically his 
opinion on the proportional election system, which he had promoted in 1993, 
prompting that he would not support the adoption of the Electoral Code. One of his 
reasons was that fact that article 76(2) of the draft Code stipulated that "the date of 
Parliamentary elections is established by decision of the Parliament". Therefore, on 18 
November, 1997, three days before the Parliament would vote the Electoral Code, in a 
presidential decree no. 373-II he set the date of parliamentary election for the 22th of 
March 1998, based on art. 7(1) of the Law on Parliamentary Elections, of 1993.  
 
Obviously, this caused reactions on concern and various interpretations. The 
Parliament passed the Electoral Code via the Law no. 1381-XIII, on 21 November, 
1997, but avoided getting into conflict with the President regarding the date of the 
elections. Anyway, the head of the state was obliged to promulgate the Electoral Code 
under certain conditions stipulated in the Constitution. That particular case showed 
how much importance is given to the aspect of setting the date for elections by 
decision-makers.  
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The next elections which took place on 25 February 2001 were early elections, being 
preceded by problems which were eventually resolved by a decision (no.4 of 26 
December 2000) of the Constitutional Court which determined the circumstances 
which justified the dissolution of the Parliament. For the third time, President 
Luchinschi had the right to set the date of elections, because, according to article 
76(3) "in case of dissolution of the Parliament, the date of elections is established by 
decree of the President of the RM." The head of the state had established the date of 
the early parliamentary elections by decree no.1843-II of 31 December 2000, which 
was published in "Monitorul oficial" on the same day. It should be noted, however, 
that the date of coming into force of that decree was 12 January 2001, unlike previous 
decrees which came into force on the date of publication. This is the only case which 
showed that when it comes to setting the election date the interests of the contestants, 
electoral bodies and citizens can be taken into account. In this particular case, 12 days 
were left between the publication of the date of elections in "Monitorul oficial" and 
the coming into force of the decree, and it was the period of winter holidays, when no 
activities or events happen, especially electoral ones. Moreover, there were 45 days 
left between the coming into force of the decree and the date of early elections, which 
is in compliance with the Electoral Code.  
 
It might seem that after the experience of the three election campaigns, in absolutely 
normal conditions, the Parliament could set the date of the upcoming elections in 
strict compliance with the electoral legislation of RM. But it wasn't meant to be. The 
main opposition parties running for parliament claim that the majority faction in 
Parliament breached at least 2 normative acts, when it set the date of parliamentary 
elections for the 6th of March, 2005, by decision no. 444-XV of 24 December, 2004, 
indicating that the decision was coming into force on the date of adoption, that is 
immediately. It was based on the Law no. 797-XIII on the Adoption of Parliament 
Regulation, of 2 April, 1996 and on the Law no. 173-XIII on the Publication and 
Coming into Force of Official Acts, of 6 July, 1994, which stipulate that official acts 
come into force on the date of publication or on another indicated date following the 
publication.  
 
Interestingly, the decisions of the Constitutional Court no. 32 of 29 October, 1998, no. 
4 of 4 February, 1999 and no. 20 of 29 April, 1999 clearly stated that normative acts 
(laws, Government and Parliament decisions) come into force only on the date of 
publication or on another set date following publication in "Monitorul Oficial". A 
curious thing to note is the fact that the above mentioned decisions were made on the 
initiative of a member of the Communist faction, Victor Cecan, and of a Cabinet 
member, supported by the same faction, which proves that decision no. 444-XV, 
which contradicts the law, was made on purpose. The purpose, obviously, was to 
register the Communist Party first, so that it appears first on the ballots. One can 
understand the fact that the Central Electoral Commission started the registration of 
parties on the basis of the principle of presumption of constitutionality of normative 
acts, unless a decision of the Constitutional Court states the contrary. What is quite 
difficult to understand is why the Constitutional Court refused to examine the appeal 
submitted by the Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party (PPCD), arguing procedural 
grounds, and why the Supreme Court of Justice refused to examine the appeal of the 
Social Democrat Party (PSD).  
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All these can have a negative impact on the election campaign. Apparently, the 
opposition parties are accumulating more and more evidences which could eventually 
be brought in contesting the final results of elections. Undoubtedly, the undermined 
access to justice during the election campaign can be regarded as a serious fault. Thus, 
article 7(3) of the Law no. 793-XIV of 10.02.2000 stipulates that "based on the 
electoral legislation the courts of justice can resolve appeals on election matters, 
except for those attributed by law in the competence of other courts of justice". The 
Electoral Code is the one such very special law, which is paramount in regulating 
election issues, which in article 66(3) stipulates that "appeals on actions and decisions 
of CEC are to be lodged at the Supreme Court of Justice". On the other hand, art. 
67(5) of the Electoral Code says that "appeals lodged in courts are examined in 
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Law on 
Administrative Procedure. This Law on Administrative Procedure in article 8(4) 
stipulates that "under conditions of the Electoral Code, the Chisinau Court of Appeal 
verifies the legality of CEC decisions related to violations of electoral legislation". As 
indicated above, the Electoral Code says a totally different thing. Obviously this 
contradiction leaves room for speculations and interpretation, thus undermining the 
principle of due resolution of electoral disputes. That is why the candidates in 
elections went to the Supreme Court of Justice and to the Court of Appeal at the same 
time. Although art. 34(7) of the Law of Administrative Procedure obliges the 
Government to prepare the necessary changes to deal with contradictions, this has not 
happened over the last 5 years.  
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The Visit of the Council of Europe Secretary General in the Republic of Moldova 
19 January 2005  
 
 
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe (CE) Terry Davis visited the 
Republic of Moldova (RM) on the 15-17 January. Terry Davis met the leadership of 
the country, members of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), leaders of political 
parties, representatives of the media and NGOs. The purpose of the visit was to "learn 
about the pre-election situation in the country".  
 
A few things about it have drawn attention: Terry Davis said he came to Chisinau on 
the invitation of the leadership of the country and of the political parties; he also said 
that the parliamentary elections due to take place on the 6th of March this year are the 
first elections of this kind in 2005 in the area of the Council of Europe, and therefore 
it will be in the limelight of the European institutions; the visit took place in weekend.  
The observations above prove the fact that there are serious concerns on the electoral 
context in the Republic of Moldova. Evidently, the leadership of the country and the 
political parties had invited the CE Secretary General separately. The exact sequence 
of events is not known, however, one could argue that concerns were signalled first 
and only afterwards the visit was organized through diplomatic arrangements.  
 
The Moldovan Authorities assured Terry Davis that it is not in their interest to rig the 
elections and that they welcome international observers.  
 
During the meeting of the CE Secretary General with members of the Central 
Electoral Commission issues were discussed such as the preparation of voter lists, 
ensuring the right to vote for students who study in localities others than their places 
of residence, of the residents of Transnistria and of the Moldovan national who are 
working abroad.  
 
The Leaders of the main political parties and formations involved in the election 
process informed the Secretary General about what they consider abuses on the part 
of the government. The leader of the alliance 'Blocul Moldova Democrata' (BMD), 
Serafim Urechean, mentioned some violations committed by the ruling party, the 
Central Electoral Commission, the central administration. Urechean especially 
mentioned actions of intimidation by the law enforcement which are present at all the 
public events organized by BMD.  
 
The leader of the Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party (PPCD), Iurie Rosca, spoke 
about "the illegalities done by the ruling party in the very start of the election 
campaign", meaning the fact that the majority faction in the parliament ignored the 
Regulation of the Parliament regarding the legislative initiative on establishing the 
date of elections, that they also ignored the legal provisions regarding the coming into 
force of normative acts, the refusal of the Constitutional Court to examine the 
notifications of the PPCD faction regarding the breaching of constitutional provisions 
when the Parliament adopted the decision setting the date of the elections.  
 
The leaders of the Social Democrat Party (PSD) informed the Secretary General about 
the impediments of access to justice in electoral issues, as well as the shortcomings of 
the electoral legislation.  
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During the meetings with NGO representatives, the Secretary General was briefed 
about the monitoring of the election process, the frequency of monitoring reports and 
their conclusions.  
 
The Secretary General of the CE participated in a talk-show with representatives of 
the media in the RM, hosted by the TV program Vector European. He said that in 
Great Britain, the country he comes from, he cannot tell the political preferences of 
the journalists who work for the public media because they cover the political events 
in a professional and unbiased manner. He called on Moldovan journalists to do the 
same. He was probably unaware that it was the fourth time in one year when they 
were urged to do this same thing: in March 2004, on the occasion when OSCE 
mission and the CE launched the "guidelines" for the coverage of events on public 
media channels; in July 2004 when the head of the state came up with the initiative to 
safeguard the democratic processes; in December 2004 when the president addressed 
the Public Company "Teleradio-Moldova" demanding it not to cover so extensively 
the achievements of the government. Perhaps this tactful allusion of the Secretary 
General was causes by the fact that he had been told that the "Teledadio-Moldova" 
journalists had on the very first day of his visit informed the people that he already 
had a "good impression about Moldova". At the end of Terry Davis' visit the 
governmental newspapers wrote: "The initiatives and actions of Moldovan authorities 
to organize free and fair elections are highly appraised and supported by the European 
institutions."  
 
The opposition press was obviously more cautious in quoting the European official, 
highlighting his statement - "I repeat, I shall not take the side of any of the parties 
involved in the election campaign. I came to Chisinau to make sure that free and fair 
elections are ensured to the people of RM."  
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Final stage of the electoral campaign 
Igor Botan, February 17, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 46, January 31 - February 13, 2005 
 
 
1. Electoral contestants  
 
Electoral campaign has entered the final stage. CEC registered 23 electoral 
contestants for the parliamentary elections of March 6, 2005, out of which 11 
parties/blocs and 12 independent candidates (for more details visit 
www.elections2005.md). As Moldova has a proportional electoral system (one 
country one constituency) political parties, blocs and independent candidates would 
all be included in the same ballot, while the voters will have to choose only one of 
them. Electoral contestants may back off at least 5 days prior to elections.  
 
For the first time the successive threshold of representation would be applied in the 
parliamentary elections. To get elected independent candidates would have to gather 
3% out of the valid votes cast, political parties - 6%, a bloc of two parties such as 
"Patria-Rodina" - 9%, and a bloc of three parties like Moldova Democrata Bloc - 
12%. Mandates are distributed according to Victor d'Hondt method.  
 
 
2. Campaigning  
 
There are two stages of the electoral campaign. The first one commenced with setting 
of the election day on December 24, 2004 and ended with the registration of electoral 
contestants, that is 23-30 days prior to e-day. Opposition was rather passive at that 
stage, it mainly appealed and contested against ruling party, accusing it of abuses in 
public media, use of administrative resources, intimidation of opposition candidates, 
obstructing opposition's meetings with the voters, influencing judiciary in 
adjudicating electoral disputes. Many of those complaints were also covered in the 
monitoring reports produced by Coalition 2005 uniting 152 NGOs of Moldova (see 
www.elections2005.md ).  
 
The second stage started 3-4 weeks prior to e-day. It has been characterized by three 
factors:  
 
a. Under Article 47 of the Electoral Code, election debates are to be held at TV 
and radio stations, while TV channels are prohibited from covering "working 
visits" of the electoral candidates holding public office. Coverage of "working 
visits" of the governors was the main avenue for TV channels to promote a 
favourable image of the ruling party, and this not as part of air time, which 
was distributed quite evenly between contestants;  
b. OSCE has started its monitoring mission. As the President, also Chair of the 
ruling party, promised back in July 2004 to guarantee a democratic electoral 
process, while international institutions and western leaders have encouraged 
him to do so, authorities would no longer hold to the practices they used to 
before OSCE mission arrival;  
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c. Opposition candidates have become more active only at the second stage, and 
this largely due to the previous two factors. Therefore they'll enjoy the level 
playing field for only a short while.  
 
Three factors are relevant in assessing the potential of electoral players: a) 2003 local 
elections results; b) tendencies shown by opinion polls; c) the way electoral 
contestants carries out their campaigns.  
 
2003 local elections were equally political and administrative. In this respect of 
special relevance are elections results at the rayon level where party lists are voted. In 
2003 Party of Communists (PC) rating slightly went down (PC ~ 48%), while that of 
the Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party went slightly up (CDPP ~ 10%) as compared 
to 2001 rating. As a rule voter turnout in local elections is about 10-15% lower, this 
partly explains rating fluctuations. 2003 local elections are a good reference point in 
estimating the potential of the Moldova Democrata Bloc (MDB). Parties members of 
the MDB gathered about 30%.  
 
Opinion polls conducted by IPP every six months after 2003 elections showed no 
signs of overturn in the rating of political parties and their leaders. Therefore, the 
second stage of the campaign would be of crucial importance for the election 
outcome. In fact, apart from the three forces already mentioned, the other 20 electoral 
contestants may count only on a successful campaign that would allow them to pass 
the threshold of representation. However, this is quite a challenge.  
 
 
3. Factors crucial for elections outcome  
 
There are a number of factors that might influence elections outcome. The aforesaid 
pointed that Party of Communists' rating had reached saturation, especially since in 
2003 it widely used the administration factor to swell its rating. On the contrary, 
major changes in domestic and foreign policies, or party modernisation, might have 
had a negative impact on the PC' rating; nevertheless the party managed to start the 
electoral race as a consolidated force, which in itself is quite an achievement.  
 
Given that PC does not have political allies of considerable weight and that "party 
modernisation" has led to the emergence of "left opposition", the strategy chosen by 
Communists was to denigrate its main political foes and it was thoroughly carried out 
through public media, especially broadcasting in the last two years.  
 
It's quite difficult to assess whether that strategy proved successful in bringing new 
voters to the Party of Communists, but it definitely succeeded in dispersing political 
forces. Under those circumstances, the safest bet the Communists could count on is to 
repeat their 2001 score. Back then out of the 28% wasted votes (by the contestants 
who failed to pass the threshold), PC received 21% of them after redistribution, i.e. 21 
mandates in addition to the 50 ones earned directly.  
 
As compared to the previous electoral race, four less contestants dared to run in 
elections. Still, this time 6 less parties/blocs would run in elections, i.e. fewer votes 
would be wasted and redistributed accordingly. Back in 2001, there were two other 
forces competing with Communists for the same electorate, Agrarian Democratic  
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Party and "Ravnopravie" Movement, and there weren't on bad terms with each other. 
The latter gathered only 2%. This time however, there are three players on the 
Communist territory, i.e. Russian-speaking voters. All three accuse PC of changing 
political course from pro-eastern to pro-western.  
 
That course stems from several factors. In 2001 PC enjoyed the support of the 
Russian Federation, Transdnistrian leaders and Russian Orthodox Church. However, 
right now things are quite opposite. Firstly, Russian State Duma haven't come with 
something wiser than threatening Moldova to introduce economic sanctions, because 
President Voronin had refused signing Kozak Memorandum on settling 
Transdnistrian conflict. Even if far from being imposed, those sanctions could 
jeopardize the political stability of the country and tarnish the image of the ruling 
party. Secondly, the hostile attitude of the Transdnistrian authorities towards PC 
might also influence the Russian-speakers vote, who traditionally vote for the 
Communists. Finally, Orthodox Church decided to refrain from interfering in the 
election campaign, albeit many of its heads wrote quite favourable articles about the 
ruling party in the state media.  
 
Nevertheless, apparently PC estimated possible losses and has come up with ways to 
compensate them. PC's electoral offer was targeted mainly at pensioners (the most 
loyal and disciplined voters). PC did "political psychotherapy" on them, by raising 
their meagre pensions, providing a minimal package of medical services free of 
charge. None of the previous governings did that before. Secondly, PC kept the 
interests of rural population, which outnumbers the urban one, high on its agenda (gas 
supply, agricultural machinery). All of this might compensate the losses to some 
extent.  
 
Yet another decisive factor is the "change" produced recently in Romania and Ukraine 
after elections. This might be a catalyst for RM. Christian-Democrats seized the 
momentum and chose orange as their colour in elections. Their leader, Iurie Rosca, 
recently said in an interview to "Nezavisimaia Moldova" that orange revolution was 
not imminent for Moldova, however if elections had been rigged, then they would 
have stood up.  
 
The mere fact that President Voronin and the leader of the Communist faction in 
Parliament hosted press conferences and snort in derision of the "corn revolution", 
shows that the very idea bothers the ruling party. Communist distress came to light 
when they attacked Coalition-2005 funded by western organisations to monitor 
electoral process. They accused the Coalition of partisanship in favour of Moldova 
Democrata Bloc and Tiraspol secessionist leaders. Curiously enough, Communists 
based their accusation on the fact that Coalition failed to report on alleged frauds 
committed by opposition, rather than being dissatisfied with the reported frauds 
committed by them. PC received a prompt response from western embassies and 
international institutions accredited to RM and had to back off.  
 
The flack against Coalition might be explained by the fear that its reports would be 
used by opposition to justify their rallies. The funny thing is that, PC accuses 
Coalition-2005 of partisanship in favour of Moldova Democrata, while the rallies are 
led by Christian-Democrats; two rival political forces that would never reach common 
grounds, according to state media.  
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There are a number of factors that might have a surprising impact on election 
outcomes. However, one thing is for sure, refraining from rigging elections is the only 
solution for avoiding would-be instability.  
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Post-election reflections 
Igor Botan, March 14, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 47, February 14-March 6, 2005 
 
 
1. Electoral campaign  
 
There were serious shortcoming in the way parliamentary elections were conducted in 
the Republic of Moldova (RM) on March 6, 2005. Still, it is important that 
International Election Observation Mission - a joint undertaking of the OSCE's Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and the European 
Parliament - found that the "6 March parliamentary elections in Moldova were 
generally in compliance with most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and 
other international election standards. They did, however, fall short of some key 
commitments, particularly regarding campaign conditions and media access, and in 
this respect, the negative trends noted already in 2003 local elections were 
confirmed".  
US State Department reached the same conclusion, as did domestic observers 
monitoring elections as part of Coalition 2005.  
 
In this respect it is worth citing the comment of the Russian Information and Press 
Department of the MFA "if we judge elections in RM by their transparency, then 
there are many doubts in this respect. During electoral campaign international 
community pointed to the use of administrative resources, biased election coverage by 
media, especially the state owned one. These conclusions could have been confirmed 
or infirmed by CIS observers, including those from Russia, but Chisinau didn't 
welcome their presence. It may be that RM authorities had something to hide if they 
acted in such a manner, resorting even to arrests and deportation of representatives of 
human rights NGOs, mainly Russian citizens, who legally wanted to join their 
colleagues from other countries in observing elections.  
 
There were numerous violations registered in the voting procedures. A huge number 
of Moldovan citizens abroad were practically denied the right to vote, which is 
granted by the Constitution of the RM. Out of the several hundred thousands 
Moldovans working in Russia only about a third were able to cast their ballot. This 
was also true for RM citizens residing in Transdniestria.  
 
Unfortunately, international observers did not take notice of those facts. This is yet 
another evidence of the double standards, practice that should be ended by means of 
developing single criteria for monitoring elections, regardless of where they are held".  
Undoubtedly, the aforesaid commentaries as well as those voiced by electoral players 
would have a considerable impact on the political stability in RM, or the lack thereof. 
In the election aftermath, while the Parliament governing bodies are elected, 
Government is appointed, and the President is elected by the Parliament - old 
hostilities would surface as would the new ones generated by the manner in which 
electoral campaign was conducted.  
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2. Election results  
 
According to the CEC, 1 576 203 citizens out of the total 2 430 537 entitled to vote 
took part in elections, i.e. 64.84%. About 7% of the voters were included in the 
supplementary lists.  
 
To compare, in 2001 parliamentary elections the voter turnout was 67.5%. Then 1 607 
095 voters participated in the elections (30,000 more), while only 5.5% of the voters 
were included in supplementary voter rolls.  
 
Noteworthy, this time 53,429 more citizens were included in the voter rolls, while the 
voter turnout was 3% lower.  
 
The difference between the number of ballots issued to the citizens and the number of 
ballots in ballot boxes was 124, while in 2001 it was 392. The number of invalid 
ballots reached 18,251 i.e. 1.16% over 19, 446 (1.21%) in 2001.  
 
As a result of March 6 parliamentary elections only three out of the twenty three 
contestants passed the threshold of representation - Party of Communists, Moldova 
Democrata Bloc, Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party. The rest 20 contestants who 
failed to pass the threshold were cast 16.42% votes that would be redistributed to the 
former three according to the d'Hondt formula. For comparison, 28% of the votes 
were redistributed in 2001 parliamentary elections.  
 
a. Party of Communists (PC) garnered 716,336 votes, i.e. 45.98%. The 
redistribution of the 16.42% votes brought 10 extra mandates to the Party of 
Communists. Therefore it would have 56 out of the 101 seats in Parliament, 
thus securing its victory in elections. Hence, Communists would be able to 
elect Parliament governing bodies and appoint the Government on its own.  
Still, this performance fades when compared to their landslide victory in 2001 
when the 50.07% votes brought them 71 seats in Parliament, 15 more than this 
time. Therefore, Communists would no longer be able to change the 
Constitution single-handedly (for which they would need 68 mandates - 2/3 of 
the deputies), nor would they be able to elect the President (61 mandates 
needed - 3/5 of the deputies). Those two factors would force Communists to 
the negotiation table with other Parliament factions.  
 
b. Moldova Democrata Bloc (MDB) was cast 444,377 votes, i.e. 28.53%. After 
redistribution according to the same d'Hondt formula it got 34 seats.  
Albeit the scepticism voiced by some of its members, MDB could be proud of  
such a result. The mere fact that it brought together three different players 
(Moldova Noastra Alliance, Democratic Party and Social-Liberal Party) that in 
their turn brought together other 15 smaller parties reduced to a great extend 
the number of wasted votes from 28% in 2001 to 16.42% in 2005.  
 
c. Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party (CDPP) garnered 141,341 votes, i.e. 
9.07%. After redistribution it got 11 seats, the same number as in the previous 
legislature.  
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Albeit grumbling about their results on the grounds they didn't compete on a 
level playing field, still CDPP confirmed the tendency of slow but steady 
increase in their rating. This time they got 10,000 more mandates, i.e. 0.8%.  
 
d. Parties/ blocs that failed to pass electoral threshold were cast 15.5% votes. 
One may classify them in three groups:  
1. Parties/blocs headed by more or less known figures and having more 
or less considerable sums to venture in electoral race. Among those 
are: Social Democratic Party (2.95%), Party of Socio-Economic Justice 
(1.66%), Peasants' Christian-Democratic Party (1.37%) and Centrist 
Union (0.75%). Those players had quite consistent electoral offers, 
some of them were quite good actually. Social-Democratic Party and 
Peasants' Christian-Democratic Party managed to conduct very active 
electoral campaigns, at times even aggressive, however the "useful 
vote" phenomenon that determined many to vote for "players standing 
real chances" to pass the threshold, has stolen many votes from them.  
2. Parties/blocs that exploited the so-called "ethnic vote". This 
specifically refers to "Patria-Rodina" Bloc (4.97%), "Ravnopravie" 
Movement (2.83%) and "Patria-Rodina" Labour Union (0.92%). Albeit 
each of them ran separately they had anti-western, pro-Russian, and 
pro-Transdniestrian message. They all directed their firepower at the 
leader of the Party of Communists, Vladimir Voronin, for his alleged 
change in the foreign policy vector from a pro-Russian to a pro-
Western one and for keeping Transdniestria under an economic and 
political blockade. In the previous elections such parties did not gather 
more than one percent. This time, however, altogether they gathered 
8.72%, on top of that, they had a landslide victory in the regions 
populated by national minorities, previously the Communists territory.  
3. Republican Party has made itself conspicuous by gathering only 592 de 
votes (0.04%), that is only 10% of its own members voted for it.  
 
e. Independent candidates altogether got 14,676 votes, i.e. 0.94% of the total 
valid votes cast. For comparison, in 2001 independent candidates gathered 
2.29%; in 1998 - 5.63%; in 1994 - 2.54%. "Useful vote" has undoubtedly 
robbed the independents of victory, not to mention the electoral threshold - 4% 
in 1997 and then lowered to 3%.  
The performance of independents has been weaker and weaker. In this 
campaign, for instance, the only thing four of them did to make themselves 
known was to give up their free air-time for a campaign aimed at denigrating 
CDPP.  
 
 
3. Parliament sociological profile  
 
It is worth mentioning several peculiarities in the sociological profile of the 
Parliament. For a start, there are 18 non-party members among the would-be deputies. 
This is a positive sign for those who defend the interests of the so-called non-party 
candidates. Secondly, the number of women deputies hit a record high 21 mandates.  
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This campaign has also confirmed some of the tendencies registered in the previous 
elections: a) 1/3 of the Parliament membership remains the same; b) 2/3 of deputies 
come from Chisinau and the regions remain again under-represented. The table 
bellow features other data, especially on their profession (as indicated by them in the 
documents submitted to CEC).  
 
Factions PC MDB CDPP Parliament as a whole
Number of members 56 34 11 101 
Non-party members 15 1 2 18 
Average age 52.7 48.1 45.9 50.4 
Number of women 11 5 5 21 
 
Residing in Chisinau 31 27 9 67 
Residing in Centre rayons 7 4 2 13 
Residing in North rayons 13 3 0 16 
Residing in South rayons 4 0 0 4 
Residing abroad 1 0 0 1 
 
Officers of the central government 13 0 0 13 
Deputies in the incumbent Parliament 24 7 3 34 
Mayors 3 2 0 5 
Officers of the local government 4 4 1 9 
 
Economists 12 9 0 21 
Lawyers 9 5 1 15 
Political scientists 11 6 0 17 
Managers 2 4 1 7 
Diplomats 2 0 0 2 
Engineers 23 12 2 37 
Agronomists 4 0 0 4 
Teachers 10 5 2 17 
Historians 2 4 1 7 
Journalists 0 1 5 6 
Doctors 3 1 0 4 
Philologists 0 1 0 1 
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Trade unions 1 1 0 2 
Directors of joint-stock companies 2 4 0 6  
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Chance of democratisation of the Republic of Moldova 
Igor Botan, 23 March 2005  
 
 
 
I. Revolution vs. evolution 
1. Premises for “orange revolution”?  
 
The March 6 parliamentary elections in Moldova did not become a catalyzer of an 
“orange revolution” aimed to eliminate the “red spot in the orange ocean”, in spite of 
the many statements and expectations. The initiative of “change” or “orange 
revolution” launched by the Christian Democratic People’s Party (PPCD) stemmed 
from the example of Ukraine or that of Romania from December 2004.  
 
There were a number of factors that made many national and international observers 
presume that the PPCD would prefer the Ukrainian version of change:  
 
a. to create advantages for itself the ruling party committed a number of abuses 
in the pre-election period, during electoral campaign and even when it 
established the election date, provoking retaliation measures of the opposition;  
b. the opposition, in particular the PPCD, reacted to abuses of the ruling party, 
adopting a suggestive conduct (the electoral symbols and messages) which 
rather invoked an Ukrainian-style “change” (orange colour and the main 
electoral poster featuring PPCD leader Iurie Rosca and the leader of the 
Ukrainian revolution, Viktor Yushchenko) etc.;  
c. with one month and half before elections, PPCD received the permission from 
Chisinau Mayoralty to organise non-stop rallies of the voters for two weeks 
immediately after the March 6 scrutiny, and this was interpreted as an 
intention to follow the Ukrainian scenario, though PPCD leaders promised to 
turn the meetings with voters into protests only if the authorities gerrymander 
the results of elections;  
d. several political parties participating in the electoral campaign, including the 
Democratic Moldova Bloc (BMD) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
said or hinted that they would support eventual post-election rallies PPCD 
against conduct of elections.  
 
2. Why the “orange revolution” did not take place?  
 
Nevertheless, “orange revolution” never happened. Local mass media and observers 
invoked a number of explanations in this regard:  
a. Moldova has specifics which differentiate it from Ukraine and Romania, here 
abuses and anti-democratic skidding took place on background of a very high 
rating of the ruling party. The explanation for the high rating is that the Party 
of Moldovan Communists (PCRM) returned to the power in 2001 after a series 
of political, economic and financial crises provoked including from outside, 
and its comeback took place on background of a relatively favourable political 
and economic context, both internally and externally.  
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The PCRM had successfully used this context, withe the price of renouncing 
at of own ideological principles. It managed to maintain and even improve 
somehow the social-economic situation. On the other hand, the opposition 
failed to persuade the most of citizens that a communist government is 
conjugated with essential “lost opportunities”. Such efforts had no chances of 
success, as the absolute majority of Moldova’s population, particularly in 
villages, has no other relatively satisfactory social-political experience but the 
communist one. In addition, the ruling party had built the “vertical of the state 
power” and took over the control on key mass media with quasi-total coverage 
of Moldova’s territory. Under these conditions, a wide and lasting support of 
citizens for opposition-held protest demonstrations was impossible;  
 
b. initiatives on foreign policy launched by President Vladimir Voronin in full 
electoral campaign made the opposition, especially the PPCD, recognise that 
they aim to fulfil the “national interest”. The visit of Romania’s President 
Traian Basescu to Chisinau, with one month and half before elections, at the 
initiative of his Moldovan counterpart Vladimir Voronin, brought hopes that 
the Moldovan-Romanian relationship would be improved. The visits of 
President Voronin to Kiev one week prior to elections for a meeting with 
President Viktor Yushchenko, and of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili 
to Chisinau a day later were regarded as a reply to abusive meddling of the 
State Duma of the Russian Federation in Moldovan elections and its threats to 
introduce economic sanctions against Moldova, as response to the “economic 
blockade” that the latter set up against the Transnistrian separatist regime. The 
talks between President Voronin and his Ukrainian and Georgian counterparts 
focussed on the following topics: struggle against separatism; diversification 
of energy sources; rebirth of GUUAM for a joint settlement of regional 
problems; coordination of efforts for European integration; convocation of the 
GUUAM summit in Chisinau on April 22, 2005. All these facts could not 
remain without a positive echo in appreciations of the PPCD. In this regard, 
the PCRM chairman attracted one part of the “revolutionary” aura of leaders 
of “rose” and “orange revolutions”;  
 
c. international observers described the March 6 parliamentary elections as 
“were generally in compliance with most OSCE and Council of Europe 
commitments and other international election standards. They did, however, 
fall short of some key commitments, particularly regarding campaign 
conditions and media access” Thus, formal reasons for protests, the way it 
happened in Georgia and Ukraine, were almost absent;  
 
d. with about one week before elections, the PPCD, as the “engine” of the 
eventual “orange revolution”, hinted that it could not hold protests, if no 
massive frauds are registered on election day. PPCD said that certain circles in 
the Russian Federation and Transnistria, which brutally meddled in the 
electoral campaign in Moldova, intended to use the “peaceful manifestations” 
in order to infiltrate agents and to challenge the authorities and protestors to a 
“bloodshed”, in a move to compromise both the authorities, and the PPCD in 
favour of a “third pro-Russia force” ready to resume the negotiations with the 
Transnistrian leaders. Under these conditions, PPCD refused to see its 
supporters, participants in protests becoming “cannon fodder”.  
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PPCD allusion to the BMD was far too obvious, which, the first said, became 
the favourite of certain Russian political circles aimed to replace the PCRM as 
the main pro-Russia political force in Moldova. In this respect, PPCD invoked 
as evidence the support of Moldovans who created the Patria-Moldova 
Association in Moscow, with the assistance of Russian authorities, as well as 
the invitation of Transnistria’s authorities to citizens in the breakaway enclave 
to elect the BMD. In addition, BMD leader Serafim Urechean said that the 
Communists massively used the visits of Basescu and Saakashvili to Chisinau 
and of Voronin to Kiev, and this was a meddling in country’s interior affairs. 
BMD leader was “disappointed over verdict of foreign observers who said that 
the elections were generally in compliance with most of European democratic 
standards,” and underlined that “the West backed the PCRM because it likes 
its assaults on Russia.” These statements of the BMD leader make a wonderful 
correlation with declarations of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which accused 
the international observers of “using double standards” in judging Moldovan 
elections.  
 
 
3. Does the “orange revolution” has any substitute?  
 
From the very benning there were not too many optimists over a “change” in Moldova 
through opposition’s victory at elections, the way it happened in Romania. The 
statements of PPCD leader Iurie Rosca served as evidence in this regard, as he said 
with about one year before elections that the future parliament will be “of transition” 
and the “minimum goal” of opposition was to garner at least 41 mandates in order to 
block up the election of president, who needs 3/5 of votes of parliamentarians, and to 
provoke early parliamentary elections this way, in line with Constitution.  
 
The “minimum goal” was fulfilled after elections — the PCRM garnered 56 mandates 
compared with 45 mandates of opposition. Perhaps this was one of arguments why no 
protests took place. There is no doubt that PPCD treated this version with much 
seriousness. A year ago, the parliamentary faction of this party had worked out and 
proposed to the parliament for examination a draft amendment to the law on election 
of Moldovan chief of state, so that the new legislature will elect the president. 
Otherwise, the PCRM would not face any problems, the old parliament in which it 
holds 71 mandates could elect the chief of state which mandate expires on April 7th 
without any special problems, and in the newly elected Parliament PCRM holds 
enough mandates in the new legislature to choose the parliament’s administration and 
to name the executive.  
 
Thus, the new elections, which the opposition in Georgia and Ukraine obtained 
through “revolutions”, can take place in Moldova on a constitutional way, if the 
opposition blocks up the election of the chief of state. However, such a scenario could 
be avoided if the PCRM and the opposition negotiate a compromise, which certain 
analysts have already described as a possible “change” or “orange evolution” in 
Moldova. Anyway, this version is better than the ongoing one in Kyrgyzstan, 
especially because the PCRM gave up the own communist principles and declares 
goals which are absolutely compatible with purposes of opposition.  
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II. Stability vs. destabilisation 
1. What are the possible “developments”?  
 
President Voronin told a news conference immediately after the March 6 elections 
that the PCRM would not make up any coalitions with any of the two opposition 
parties. He was sure that it would not be a big problem to attract the missing five 
votes of opposition parliamentarians for the election of the president, making very 
transparent allusions that such actions happened in the precedent parliament as well. 
The chief of state called on the “civic spirit” of opposition lawmakers who will have 
to participate in election of the new president of Moldova.  
 
It seems that this is the simplest and most natural approach of the problem. The 
negative side is that opposition leaders regarded this attitude as a proof that the PCRM 
is ready to resort to “blackmail” and “political corruption” in order to accomplish its 
own interests. As a result, both the PPCD, and the BMD said publicly that their 
factions would not participate in the elections of the chief of state and they would 
provoke early parliamentary elections this way.  
 
These standpoints demonstrate very clearly three possible scenarios of developments 
following the parliamentary elections: blocked election of the chief of state and 
provocation of early parliamentary elections; “purchase of votes” from opposition by 
PCRM, so that to ensure support for election; negotiations between the ruling party 
and the two factions of the parliamentary opposition.  
 
2. Blocked election of the chief of state is probably the worst version. It can be 
implemented if the PCRM gives up negotiations with the other two opposition 
factions which remain consolidated in turn and do not participate in election of 
president or vote against the Communist candidate, if they take part in voting.  
 
The PCRM faction holds 56 mandates, but it needs 61 mandates to elect the chief of 
state. Under Article 78 of Constitution, the Moldovan president is elected in two 
rounds and a candidate must garner at least 3/5 of votes of parliamentarians. Repeated 
elections take place if the lawmakers fail to choose the chief of state. If the chief of 
state is chosen nor at repeated elections, the acting president dissolves the parliament 
and announces early parliamentary polls.  
 
Perhaps the early parliamentary elections could seriously destabilise the political and 
economic situation in Moldova. There are several factors which could turn the early 
parliamentary elections into an adventure with sad perspectives:  
 
• The opposition could face the following negative effects:  
a. political convictions and sympathies of Moldovan electors are based 
on a high inertia level and therefore no significant changes but in 
situations of acute social-economic crisis could be expected;  
b. the most of Moldovan citizens would not like the idea of early 
parliamentary elections because this event would be interpreted as an 
impermissible luxury in “the poorest state in Europe”;  
c. the opposition will hardly explain to citizens why it had blocked the 
election of the chief of state and provoked early parliamentary polls, 
since the international observers described the March 6 scrutiny as  
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generally in compliance with the international standards. As a result, 
this could have a negative impact on participation of citizens in voting 
without knowing who would benefit from an eventual lower 
participation of electorate the most;  
d. the Moldovan opposition could not be sure that the early elections 
would bring the effects of the Georgian “rose revolution” and 
Ukrainian “orange revolution”. Georgia and Ukraine held repeated 
elections after street protests against results of gerrymandered 
elections. The courage to contest the abuses committed by authorities 
during elections, indicated in reports of international election 
monitoring missions, consolidated the electorate of protest leaders 
from these countries who also gained the sympathy of supporters of 
weaker parties and leaders, as well as of irresolute voters;  
e. there is no doubt that the propaganda machinery of rulers would be 
restored to exploit the “irresponsibility” of opposition and the lack of 
“civic consciousness” of its lawmakers at maximum. This propaganda 
machinery would explain to citizens that early elections were provoked 
artificially in spite of the fact that the international observers regarded 
the elections in Moldova as in line with the international standards, in 
spite of big reservations;  
f. the reactions of the international community would unlikely favour an 
early parliamentary scrutiny. Russia would evidently be an exception, 
as it hinted through its Foreign Ministry that the Moldovan elections 
were faulty, and this means that it could meddle more significantly in 
an eventual early scrutiny in order to influence a result favourable to its 
interests.  
 
In principle PPCD should not be afraid of early parliamentary elections. This 
party has a stable and aware electorate which would give the same percent of 
votes at an early parliamentary scrutiny. The recent parliamentary elections 
confirmed the tendency of a stable but very slow growth of rating of this party 
in spite of very bitter assaults on the party, which would be regarded as 
impermissible in an honest campaign. Even more, the PPCD demonstrated that 
not the so-called “little drive horses” choose the electoral fate of the party, an 
argument invoked by certain observers regarding the support the party won 
thanks to Ilie Ilascu at the 1994 elections, to Mircea Snegur in 1998, and to 
Nicolae Alexei in 2001, but by contrary creates new opportunities alone. The 
insistence of the PPCD created the situation when the old parliament could not 
elect the chief of state. Also, these factors show that there are no reasons for 
exaggerate optimism regarding the electoral chances of the PPCD at an 
eventual early parliamentary scrutiny. Its score would rather be similar to the 
recent one, but the party would use up a lot of energy and financial resources.  
 
The BMD cannot have a clear perspective to improve its electoral score in 
case of eventual early parliamentary elections. First of all, the three 
components of BMD (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social 
Liberal Party) had different visions regarding a number of strategic issues and 
the need to provoke early parliamentary elections. Secondly, the mass media 
non-affiliated to the BMD is abundant of reports that the BMD 
parliamentarians have been threatened in order to maintain their post-electoral  
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cohesion (as some of them could be “bribed” or “corrupted” by PCRM) and to 
make them refuse the participation in election of the chief of state. The PPCD 
leader asked their BMD opposition colleagues why they introduced in their list 
of candidates people who can cede to blackmail and corruption? This could 
have the worst consequences for cohesion of the bloc. Thirdly, the BMD said 
that it welcomes other parties which did not succeed the electoral threshold on 
March 6, and this could challenge suspicions among elected parliamentarians 
of this bloc. Certain lawmakers who were recently elected in the list of BMD 
could rather “enter the same river twice” than the list of BMD candidates. 
Fourthly, the BMD would become the main target of assaults of PPCD and 
PCRM at eventual early parliamentary elections, which would accuse it of 
being the favourite of “revengeful circles” in Moscow and Transnistrian 
separatists. Under such conditions, a better electoral race than at the March 6 
elections would be hardly expected.  
 
• The negative effects of early parliamentary elections will particularly hit 
the PCRM:  
a. in an eventual propaganda duel between the opposition and the ruling 
party on conduct of early elections the first could provide plausible 
arguments in favour of these elections. Firstly, the recent electoral 
campaign took place with grave violations related to introduction of 
the so-called “vertical of the power”, which fueled the use of 
“administrative resources”, setup of a control on public mass media, 
justice, etc. Secondly, the PCRM garnered by 15 less mandates at the 
recent parliamentary elections, winning less than 30 percent of votes of 
Moldovan citizens included in electoral lists. Therefore, the chance of 
the PCRM to elect the own candidate as chief of state besides the right 
to choose the parliamentary administration and to create the cabinet of 
ministers is not justified. By contrary, the election of a PCRM 
candidate as chief of state would mean conservation of the “vertical of 
the power” — the object of the fight of opposition in the past four 
years. Even more, “the vertical of the power” is in an obvious 
contradiction with the strategic purpose regarding the entry in the 
European Union, posted by the PCRM itself, and therefore it must be 
disconcerted;  
b. abusive involvement of foreign factor in Moldovan elections had 
completely developed when the State Duma of the Russian Federation 
passed three decisions on Moldova on the eve of the March 6 scrutiny 
and in only two weeks, threatening to introduce an entire range of 
economic and political sanctions. Waiting for eventual early elections, 
the State Duma is ready to maintain the tense relations with Moldova, 
demanding the Russian government “to unveil concrete proposals” 
regarding the introduction of economic sanctions against Moldova. 
Russian press reports described the involvement of Russian authorities 
in the recent elections in Moldova as an unsuccessful one. Therefore, 
the organisation of early elections would offer an opportunity to 
Russian authorities to take revenge;  
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c. waiting for eventual early elections, the Transnistrian separatist 
authorities have already resorted to very dangerous provocations such 
as the recent assault of Transnistrian military on the Vasilievca village 
and the storming of the telecommunication station in this settlement. 
The PCRM would be responsible for any crisis situations, regardless of 
the sources of provocations and destabilisation, because it rules the 
country;  
d. testing the eventuality to garner more votes, the PCRM runs the risk to 
lose more mandates because the number of votes lost by parties which 
cannot succeed the electoral threshold would dramatically decline. 
Firstly, the most of competitors who did not succeed the electoral 
threshold would not take part in elections because their participation is 
useless. Secondly, the three pro-Russia, pro-Transnistria, anti-West 
and anti-PCRM parties (two Patria-Rodina parties and Ravnopravye) 
would probably merge to participate in the parliamentary scrutiny with 
one list of candidates. The recent elections demonstrated that they 
could garner together up to ten percent of votes of electors, and this 
may make the leaders of these parties forget the differences which 
separate them. In addition, if the three parties merge, they have more 
chances to attract one part of electoral of the PCRM than vice versa;  
e. the PCRM would have to persuade three, not two parties after early 
elections to participate in election of the chief of state, and the situation 
would worsen because all the three parties would be in very bad 
relations with the PCRM, while one of them would even be in 
extremely antagonistic relations. This could have dramatic 
consequences for unity of the PCRM;  
f. following is the conclusion of all the facts mentioned above: the early 
parliamentary elections would be the riskiest for the PCRM. The 
opposition parties could lose several mandates, but they would remain 
in opposition anyway. Instead, the PCRM could be to blame for 
destabilisation of political situation and could lose the opportunity to 
keep the power. Thus, the PCRM should be afraid of early elections 
the most, while the opposition should seize this situation in order to 
obtain the democratisation of society by disconcerting the “vertical of 
the power” and ensuring some adequate conditions for activity of 
opposition.  
 
3. “Buying votes” by PCRM seems to be the most likely solution, and it could be 
implemented if the PCRM “persuades” a part of opposition parliamentarians to 
support its candidate by calling on “civic consciousness”, no matter if leaders of 
opposition factions decide not to participate in election of the chief of state or decide 
to vote for an alternative candidacy.  
 
The PPCD does not have the minimum number of 15 lawmakers to propose its own 
candidate, and therefore it could do what it had done at the 2001 elections: not to 
participate in voting. It is hard to say under what conditions the PPCD would 
participate in election of the chief of state, in absence of a consensual candidacy, once 
it had maintained and continues to maintain an anti-communist rhetoric.  
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On the other hand, forgetting what it had earlier said, the BMD stated that it could 
participate in the presidential elections in case of a non-communist or own candidate. 
Thus, the key decision to participate in the secret voting, which offers the opportunity 
to BMD parliamentarians to vote contrary to what their leaders say, though the latter 
announced that “the BMD lawmakers had assumed moral obligations not to elect a 
communist candidate,” is important.  
 
Therefore, the effort of the PCRM to “buy” at least five votes from opposition seems 
to be meaningful. However, this solution could have very risky consequences, in 
particular, to challenge eventual crisis situations later:  
 
a. The PCRM is being “modernised” in line with an order of its leader Vladimir 
Voronin. The PCRM avoided the “modernisation” at the December 2004 
congress, in order to shun an eventual splitting before electoral campaign. On 
the other hand, this successful tactic at a first glance could mean that the list of 
candidates of PCRM, as well as the “Trojan horse” have brought the danger of 
an eventual outside splitting inside of the new faction of PCRM. Thus, the 
former “monolith” of the Communist parliamentary faction could challenge 
dangerous cracks including in the polling booth during the secret election of 
the chief of state. “Fishing votes in the dim relations of opposition,” the 
PCRM could see how one part of its lawmakers could disappoint it. Indeed, a 
number of analysts believe that the PCRM leader had included only loyal or 
controllable persons in the list of candidates. However, such a scenario could 
not be excluded since the PCRM is not anymore a political organisation based 
on an ideology which moulds clear references of internal and external policies. 
The only trump of the PCRM, which holds the crew of party altogether, is the 
charismatic image of its leader who enjoys the biggest trust and support of 
Moldova’s citizens and demonstrated that he can ensure a victory at elections. 
However, the PCRM leader had become the target of assaults of certain 
political circles and mass media in the Russian Federation. The intensity, 
periodicity and coherence of these assaults aim to persuade one part of 
Moldovan public opinion, especially the so-called Russian-speaking citizens, 
that Vladimir Voronin is allegedly promoting an “anti-Russian” policy.  
b. “buying votes” of certain opposition lawmakers would dramatically 
undermine the opportunity of principle of a conciliation with the PCRM for 
promotion of the “national interest”, even if the latter would successfully 
finish its announced “modernisation” by accepting a new name. This way, the 
proverb “the wolf sheds his fur but not his nature” would become true. The 
PCRM would lose the credibility which could be very useful when it could 
invoke the need to join the forces in order to fulfil the “national interest”, 
especially for eventual continuation of foreign pressures from the Russian 
Federation. The reforming wing of the PCRM should think about the need to 
“ensure shelter” in case the PCRM would split under pressures of foreign 
circles, since the director of the CIS Institute, Constantin Zatulin, member of 
the State Duma of the Russian Federation, had said that “Russia will make 
those who do not love it at least to respect it.” Obviously, the Russian 
politicians understand the love for Russia as love for what they like, including 
the Transnistrian regime. President Voronin “does not love” the Transnistrian 
regime and therefore he was libelled as anti-Russian politician and he could be 
obliged to “respect Russia”, which will continue to threaten with “economic  
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sanctions”. This happens in spite of the fact that Voronin “loves” Smirnov 
much more than, for example, Putin and Russian politicians “love” 
Yandarbyev and Mashadov. This is not an use of double standards, this is only 
an irrational “love”;  
c. the recent developments related to arrest of former defence minister of 
Moldova Valeriu Pasat, former director of the domestic security service SIS in 
the acting cabinet of ministers of Premier Vasile Tarlev, and advisor for the 
Russian giant RAO “EES Rossii” manager, Anatoli Chyubais, on March 11, 
with a couple of days after elections, as well as the arrest of some people who 
had reportedly bribed functionaries of the Chisinau City Hall, are regarded as 
attempts to split and isolate the BMD components and BMD leader Serafim 
Urechean. Chisinau Mayor Urechean is being accused of participation in grave 
corruption-related actions and abuses for three years. In spite of lots of 
accusations and arrests of a number of city hall functionaries, the justice did 
not receive any evidence of his guilt. Urechean voiced his claim to replace 
Vladimir Voronin in the presidential post during the electoral campaign. Press 
reports affiliated to the ruling party said that Valeriu Pasat was an organiser of 
the Patria-Moldova organisation of Moldovan internationals in Russia, which 
openly supported the BMD. Even more, it was presumed that Pasat was a 
contact link between Urechean and Russian circles which supported the latter. 
It is difficult to indicate the truth and gossip in this situation, but President 
Voronin said on March 1, 2005 in an interview with the 35th issue of the 
Moscow-based publication: “We hold information that certain forces in Russia 
prepare an attempt against me, as they do not like a person who brings closer 
the Transnistria settlement through his efforts.” That’s why the arrest of the 
former SIS head arouses a special interest and the arrest of Pasat and electoral 
developments in Moldova seem to be very coincidental. Eight years had 
passed since Pasat, as defence minister of Moldova, had carried out the 
transaction related to the sale of 21 MIG-29 aircraft from the National Army’s 
patrimony to the United States. Two special parliamentary commissions had 
investigated this issue since then, while the Moldovan authorities said that 
they have no pretensions against the U. S. This case is so confused that 
conclusions could be wrong. However, this case had irritated more certain 
influent circles in Russia and the splitting of BMD and attraction of a number 
of votes by PCRM are risky, and a more lasting solution is required.  
 
 
4. Compromise — an ideal version?  
 
However, an ideal but unlikely version is possible. Paradoxically, the existing 
situation offers an extraordinary chance both to the opposition, and to the ruling party 
not to slip to an eventual impasse with unfavourable consequences for Moldova. Even 
more, a solution could be found to a number of strategic problems faced by Moldova 
by accepting the so-called “national consensus”. An eventual compromise should 
strengthen the democracy and develop the European integration process.  
 
There are premises for such a solution. All the three parties which succeeded to the 
newly-elected legislature had almost the same offers in their electoral programmes: 
development of economy on basis of market principles; improvement of social 
assistance, creation of new jobs, higher salaries; European integration. These parties 
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could get rid of antagonistic enmities if their leaders accept to judge their political 
adversaries on basis of facts, not on basis of stereotypical tags used for mutual 
defamation propaganda purposes. Evidently, guarantees against eventual anti-
democratic skidding are absolutely needed.  
 
It seems to be an illusion that the opposition parties and PCRM could create a 
“government of national unity”. The PCRM garnered enough mandates to rule alone. 
The opposition parties should announce very clearly their conditions for participation 
in the election of the chief of state. These conditions could be based only on very 
clear values and arguments, so that the ruling party, international organisations and 
common citizens of Moldova could understand them. This is necessary, so that the 
opposition parties which care about their image and want to influence the political life 
in Moldova in continuation, keeping the perspective to reach the power at further 
campaigns, be able to provide convincing arguments why they gave up their intention 
to block up the presidential elections.  
 
These are:  
 
a. insistence on election as chief of state of a person who is not member of any 
party or would commit himself to stop such a quality immediately after 
election in this post. There are several arguments in this regard. Firstly, the 
Constitution of Moldova says that the Moldovan president represents the state 
and guarantees the unity of the country. The spirit of constitutional norm 
saying that the chief of state is elected with the vote of qualified majority of 
“3/5 of the number of elected parliamentarians” indicates to the “compromise 
nature of the chief of state.” Voting in this case is a simple affirmation of the 
compromise between parliamentary factions.  
Secondly, the constitutional competences of the chief of state, as well as the 
tasks provided by law, are wide enough, and require their fulfillment for the 
“national interest” alone. Thus, the chief of state holds exceptional 
constitutional competences in the areas of foreign policy, defence, 
appointment of chairmen and deputy chairmen of courts, etc. The state 
security law names the chief of state as head of the Supreme Security Council, 
which brings together all the law enforcement bodies of Moldova. The law 
obliges all these institutions to fulfil their tasks on basis of political non-
partisanship principle. Or, the presidential experience of the past four years of 
Vladimir Voronin had demonstrated the danger of anti-democratic skidding 
when the chief of state is also a party member: creation of the vertical of the 
state power on structure of the PCRM; participation in the 2003 local elections 
in favour of the Communist candidate and against other bidders, etc;  
b. the opposition parties should negotiate the compromise on participation in the 
presidential elections through agreement of the ruling party to accept the 
revision of normative documents aimed to ensure the independence of justice 
and mass media, local public administration, etc. Indeed, the election of a 
chief of state who is not member of any party would be a guarantee in this 
regard, as the president has the right to veto and the right to legislative 
initiative;  
c. the opposition should try to persuade the PCRM to accept an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court to find out whether the chief of state can be party 
member. The PPCD had requested the Constitutional Court in this regard four  
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years ago, but the latter turned down its appeal saying that this issue does not 
rest with its competence. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court, as 
political-juridical institution, had demonstrated that it accepts to examine the 
appeals of lawmakers in dependence of political juncture. As for example, the 
Constitutional Court had accepted three appeals on terms of enactment of 
laws, decisions of the cabinet of ministers, parliament, but it refused to pass a 
decision on enforcement of the scandalous parliament decision on date of 
parliamentary elections. Thus, the support of the PCRM for examination of the 
political-juridical problem regarding the party membership of the chief of state 
is very important. So, the Constitutional Court could decide to pass a decision 
on this problem, in particular, because the problem of election of the chief of 
state permanently generates political crises after amendment of the Moldovan 
Constitution in 2000, if no party holds the needed 3/5 majority, and this 
happens not too often.  
A court ruling in this regard would be a guarantee that the chief of state would 
moderate the political processes with participation of political forces with their 
typical interests. A consensus on this issue would be the appearance of a 
minimum mutual confidence between political forces, which would call on the 
need to join the efforts in order to accomplish the “national interest” in case of 
crisis.  
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